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Abstract: Since modern research on medieval thought first began to gather 
momentum in the late nineteenth century, scholars have held fast to a number of key 
assumptions about the Franciscan intellectual tradition, which was founded early in 
the thirteenth century and continues to flourish to this day. In recent years, 
groundbreaking research has increasingly called these assumptions into question, 
opening up new directions in the field of Franciscan studies for assessing long-
neglected aspects of the Franciscan intellectual tradition and nuancing its supposed 
relationship to the ‘origins of modernity’.  
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New Directions in Franciscan Studies 
 
Since modern research on medieval thought first began to gather momentum 
in the late nineteenth century, scholars have held fast to a number of key assumptions 
about the Franciscan intellectual tradition, which was founded early in the thirteenth 
century and continues to flourish to this day. In particular, they have arrived at the 
consensus that Franciscans before John Duns Scotus (c. 1266-1308) were relatively 
unoriginal systematisers of the longstanding medieval intellectual tradition 
inaugurated by Augustine (354-430). By contrast, Scotus himself is believed to have 
broken with this tradition in ways that laid the foundation for the rise of modern 
philosophy and theology, and even politics, economics, and science.  
In recent years, groundbreaking research has increasingly called these 
assumptions into question, opening up new directions in the field of Franciscan 
studies for assessing the mass of neglected material that pre-dates Scotus and for 
rethinking or at least nuancing his relationship to the ‘origins of modernity’. In what 
follows, I will sketch some of these new directions. As a preliminary to this effort, 
however, I will start by providing a bit of background to the study of Franciscan 
thought, elaborating on the factors that have helped further the consensus described 
above. Next, I will discuss some recent research, including my own, which has cast 
doubt on this consensus. In this context, I will provide a few examples from 
Franciscan thought that problematise the reigning consensus. This discussion will lead 
naturally into a final section, which will highlight some key areas in the field that 
merit further exploration.  
 
Background to Franciscan Studies 
 
The Franciscan order was founded in 1209 by Francis of Assisi—one of the 
most charismatic religious leaders of all time—who called his followers to a life of 
absolute poverty and service to the poor. Within 20 years of its founding, by which 
time the order had grown to include around 5,000 mostly lay members, leaders within 
the order realized the need to establish an intellectual tradition that would provide a 
basis for training novices and legitimize Franciscan participation in the young 
universities of Paris and Oxford, as was quickly becoming essential to obtaining 
intellectual credibility with the laity of the day.1  
Under the supervision of Alexander of Hales (1185-1245), who is often 
credited as the founder of the Franciscan school, the first Franciscan university 
masters worked together to author a theological and philosophical Summa, which was 
one of the first Summae to be written in the period that became known for them, and 
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which was completed 20 years before Thomas Aquinas even began to compose his 
magisterial Summa Theologiae. This massive Summa Halensis or Summa fratris 
Alexandri (‘Summa of Brother Alexander’) as it is variously called provided a basis, 
at least through the thirteenth century, for the academic training of Franciscans, 
including Alexander’s prize student Bonaventure (1221-74), as well as his successor 
John Duns Scotus.  
According to the standard scholarly narrative, Bonaventure gave mature 
expression to the tradition he inherited from his teachers and is therefore regarded as 
the prime representative of the early Franciscan school, that is, the school as it 
developed before Scotus. On observing the affinity of Bonaventure and his teachers 
for quoting Augustine, therefore, scholars have consistently drawn the conclusion that 
members of the early school were fundamentally Augustinian thinkers, whose 
primary concern was to codify Augustine’s longstanding intellectual tradition and 
thereby re-assert his authority at a time when Aristotle’s recently re-discovered major 
works were rapidly rising in popularity.2 
By contrast, as already noted, scholars have generally believed that Franciscan 
academics working later in the thirteenth century, above all, Duns Scotus and William 
of Ockham (c. 1287-1347), finally recognized the Augustinian worldview of their 
Franciscan predecessors as outmoded, and departed from or at least significantly 
revised it in ways that laid the foundation for the later development of modern 
thought, particularly in the fields of theology and of philosophy. As the alleged 
inaugurators of the so-called via moderna and the first genuinely innovative 
Franciscan thinkers, Scotus and Ockham as well as their successors have received 
considerable scholarly attention throughout the modern period, not least when it 
comes to identifying continuities between medieval and modern thought.3 
By contrast, the work of the early Franciscan school has been very little 
studied, with the limited exception of Bonaventure, who nevertheless remains vastly 
under-researched by comparison to a medieval giant like Thomas Aquinas. After all, 
he is merely the most mature representative of what is otherwise an unoriginal 
‘Augustinian’ tradition, at least in the standard and still popular opinion.4 On this 
assumption, scholars have almost completely neglected the copious works of 
Bonaventure’s teachers, including Alexander of Hales, John of La Rochelle, and the 
other possible authors of the Summa Halensis. After completing critical editions of 
Bonaventure (1902), the Summa Halensis (1924-48), and Alexander of Hales’ major 
works (1951-60), they largely abandoned the project of editing these works, which 
can only be consulted in manuscript form.5   
Another reason for the neglect of Summa in particular concerns the difficulties 
involved in determining exactly which early Franciscan authored which section of the 
text, though reasonably strong conclusions can be drawn in this regard.6 Although the 
questions surrounding authorship do not negate its status as an indicator of the 
‘collective mind’ of the early Franciscan school, scholars have shied away from this 
text nonetheless, as a result of an excessive and one might say distinctly modern 
preoccupation with the questions of authorship. Thus, the early school remains 
virtually un-investigated by comparison to many other areas of medieval research.  
 
Recent Research  
 
In recent years, the research I have undertaken has begun to disclose reasons 
to doubt the assumption that the later Franciscan school represents a wholly 
innovative break from an earlier, unoriginal tradition. In this connection, it has 
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exposed and problematised a scholarly tendency to read scholastic, including 
Franciscan, texts at face value, that is, to presume that quotations to an authority like 
Augustine entail a sort of slavish allegiance to his views. While quotations from 
Augustine represent around a quarter of the quotations in the Summa Halensis, to say 
nothing of other key Franciscan writings, this was far from unusual at the time.7 The 
Sentences of Peter Lombard and the writings of other medieval thinkers like Hugh of 
St Victor also include a disproportionate number of citations to Augustine.  
After all, this was a time in which it was standard practice to develop 
arguments in conversation with Augustine, as well as a wide range of other 
authorities. In that light, the much more interesting question to pose to any scholastic 
text concerns the way scholars employed authorities. As soon as we examine their 
writings with more than just a glance, we can immediately see that they exhibit almost 
no concern for the accuracy or consistency of their quotations. The point of reading 
authoritative sources was clearly not to interpret Augustine or any other figure on his 
own terms but purposefully to show that different readings of can be taken on 
different points and ultimately to develop one's own often wholly original account of 
the matter under consideration. As one scholar summarises, this was a period when 
‘everyone could use the tradition as he chose.’8 For this reason, it is far too simplistic 
to say that the first Franciscans simply followed Augustine. They worked with their 
own ends in mind.  
As my past research has established, moreover, those ends were very much 
informed by the religious order in which ideas were developed.9 Since most 
theologians and philosophers during the high scholastic period were members of a 
religious order with a specific charter and agenda, this should come as no surprise. In 
the case of the first Franciscan scholars, who worked from the 1230s, the goal in the 
wake of Francis' death in 1228 was give expression in theological and philosophical 
form to the ‘little poor man’s’ unique spiritual and ministerial vision, thereby making 
it possible to pass that vision on to new generations of Franciscan novices and indeed 
to lend legitimacy to Franciscan participation in university life.10 As this vision was 
wholly original, their efforts could not help but result in the creation of a totally 
unprecedented intellectual tradition, which was codified in the Summa Halensis.  
In the effort to translate Francis' charismatic persona into an intellectual 
‘system’, the Franciscans followed the trend of their times and ‘cherry-picked’ from a 
vast range of sources to develop their own views. While they quoted Augustine in 
some cases, an examination of those cases reveals that they were generally far from 
providing a mono-dimensional reading of him. As the great medievalist Etienne 
Gilson noted long ago, they exhibited a marked tendency, among others, to ‘project’ 
ideas from the Arab scholar Avicenna on to quotations from Augustine. Although this 
period is normally seen as one concerned with the appropriation of Aristotle, Dag 
Hasse has highlighted that until the 1250s and 60s and thus in the period of the 
Summa’s authorship (1236-45; with final sections completed as late as 1255/6), many 
of Aristotle’s major works had yet to appear in trustworthy translations.  
By contrast, the works of Avicenna were readily available in superb 
translations; while these works appeared under the same titles as Aristotle’s works, 
they were not mere commentaries but developed their own original perspectives. 
Although Gilson supposed those perspectives to be compatible with the project of 
‘systematizing’ Augustine, a more nuanced reading, such as Dag Hasse has offered, 
reveals them to be highly conducive to the Franciscan project of ‘translating’ Francis’ 
example into a theological and philosophical system.11 When the Franciscans quote 
Augustine, consequently, it normally bears comparing their reading to the relevant 
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texts of Avicenna to determine the evident parallels that can be drawn. Some 
examples may prove helpful here.  
 
Examples from Franciscan Thought 
 
In a treatise on how we know God in the Summa Halensis, the authors of the 
Summa quote a negligible number of other sources in favor of providing 70 
quotations from Augustine, 34 of which are to his ep. 147 (De videndo Dei), 31 to 
other works like De libero arbitrio, De Genesi ad litteram, De vera religione, De 
Trinitate, and Soliloquia, and 5 to pseudo-Augustinian works, such as De spiritu et 
anima, which were believed to be authentic at the time.12 At the decisive point in the 
argument, the Summa cites chapter 13 of this spurious work, which distinguishes 
between superior and inferior parts of reason, which are also mentioned in some of 
Augustine’s authentic works. ‘The superior part is ordered towards the contemplation 
of God and eternal things, and the inferior part is for the contemplation of creatures 
and temporal things.’13  
According to the Summa’s reading of this text, the knowledge of God is 
innately implanted in the superior reason in the human mind. Although it is 
impossible to know God by inferior reason alone, God can be known through 
creatures, which reflect him in different ways, when inferior reason is informed by 
superior reason. Furthermore, he may be known in himself through reflection upon 
the innate knowledge of him that can be found precisely there. If the mind fails to 
access this knowledge, whether of God himself or of creatures, it is because of a 
stubborn will, which becomes preoccupied with the objects of inferior reason and 
thereby becomes ignorant of the knowledge of God implanted in superior reason. By 
repenting before God of this sin, and thus through the softening of the will out of love 
for God, however, the mind my regain access to the knowledge that is always there.  
Although attributed to Augustine, this quite idiosyncratic interpretation of the 
way higher and lower reason co-operate was originally a product of Avicenna.14 
According to Avicenna, higher reason, or the theoretical face of the soul is turned 
upwards toward the realm of universal forms, while the practical face is turned 
downwards. It uses the universals acquired by the theoretical faculty to deal with 
matters pertaining to bodily life. For this purpose, the higher reason is innately 
impressed with certain transcendental concepts, above all, that of Being—or God—
which presupposes true understanding of all beings as creatures of God. Rather than 
providing the content of knowledge of those beings, the innate concept of Being 
regulates the mind’s efforts to render experiences of them intelligible, thus ensuring 
that correct ideas about them are formed, that is, ideas corresponding to God’s own. 
This is precisely the account of knowledge that the Summa implicitly invokes 
in the question on the knowledge of God and develops further in other treatises, 
including its treatise on the rational soul. On my argument, the decision to project it 
on to Augustine was a strategic move made by Franciscans seeking to legitimize on 
the terms of Christian tradition a particular manner of experiencing God and the world 
which was familiar to Francis, if outlined by Avicenna. As many hagiographic texts 
testify, the saint enjoyed a constant, intuitive connection with God—here explained in 
terms of the innate knowledge of the ‘Being’ of God—which in turn made it possible 
to gain immediate insight into the meaning and value of all things, great and small.15 
Whereas early Franciscans manipulated quotations from Augustine to their 
own ends in many cases, there are other quite significant instances in which they 
depart from him completely. In the case of the doctrine of God, for instance, they 
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replace Augustine’s emphasis on ‘simplicity’ as the fundamental feature of the divine 
nature with an emphasis on divine infinity.16 Although they find a way around 
implying that the doctrine of divine infinity promotes a concept of God as wholly 
other only in ‘quantitative’ rather than ‘qualitative’ terms, this doctrine nonetheless 
lays an exceptionally strong emphasis on the continuities between finite creatures and 
God, who is the sum total of all possible and actual finite beings. In this way, it 
allowed Franciscans following Francis to lay a special stress upon God’s individual 
knowledge of and love for creatures—a love Francis sought to emulate. 
The Franciscan doctrine of the Trinity further elaborates Francis’ unique 
understanding of the nature of God’s love. Abandoning the longstanding tradition of 
Augustinian Trinitarian theology, Franciscans like Alexander turned to the more 
recent doctrine of Richard of St Victor and adopted it as their own. For his part, 
Augustine took a psychological model as the foundation for his understanding of the 
Trinity. On this model, the Father as first knower communicates himself to the Son, 
who is not only known by but also knows the Father. In turn, their knowledge of one 
another indicates a desire to know or love for the other that consists in the Holy 
Spirit.17  
By contrast, Richard proposes a communitarian or social model that bears 
obvious signs of a Greek Trinitarian influence, although Richard does uphold the 
crucial Latin doctrine of the filioque, that is, the procession of the Spirit from both the 
Father and the Son.18 At the start of his discussion, Richard insists that God as the 
supreme good must be a God of love, since no being that is supremely good would 
withhold its goodness from another—or withhold love. Since love must be aimed at 
another, Richard concludes that there must be at least two persons in God.19  
On the assumption that the love of the first two persons must be the same in its 
nature, intensity and direction in order to achieve perfection, Richard concludes that 
perfect love consists in a ‘shared love’ on the part of the Father and Son for a third 
person, who is the full expression of their love.20 While the first person is a 
‘monarchial’ figure as in the Greek East who is characterized by a purely gratuitous 
or self-giving love for the Son and Spirit, consequently, the second both receives love 
from the Father and gives it in the Spirit; finally, the third simply stands as the object 
and complete reflection of divine love. 
In adopting this account of the Trinity, early Franciscans emphasized the 
absolutely self-emptying or self-sacrificial nature of God’s love, paradigmatically 
expressed in Christ, which Franciscans sought to emulate through their own vows of 
complete poverty. Furthermore, they gave an account of the inner relations amongst 
the persons, which, when extrapolated for the doctrine of creation, made it possible to 
describe all creatures as perfect and complete, albeit finite, reflections of God’s love, 
in a manner analogous to the Spirit, that deserve our service and care. 
Indeed, the Franciscan doctrine of God whether as one or as Triune had many 
profound implications for Franciscan views on other matters, for instance, what it 
means to be created in the image of God, to lose the image through sin, and to regain 
it through the redemptive work of Christ. In that sense, the radical departure from 
Augustine at this initial level could not help but generate further deviations down the 
line, which must be investigated even in cases where Augustine continues to be 
quoted. As we have seen in the example from Avicenna, those quotations do not 
ordinarily indicate allegiance to Augustine but are a means of developing unique 
doctrines, which are often informed by other, even Arabic sources, that were 
ultimately consistent with the theology of the Franciscan order, and in turn the 
religious vision of Francis.  
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New Directions in Franciscan Studies 
 
What, then, are the implications of the above analysis for the future of 
Franciscan studies? At an initial level, I have charted a new course for methodology 
in the field of Franciscan and medieval studies more generally by exposing some of 
the idiosyncrasies of the scholastic method of using sources, and especially the 
tendency of scholastic authors to manipulate sources for the ends of a particular 
religious party or agenda. In doing this, I have highlighted the innovativeness of early 
Franciscan thought and challenged the longstanding view that this school is 
insignificant. By these means, I have brought into focus the vast range of texts 
associated with the school, which have scarcely been studied and in many cases not 
even critically edited. In sum, I have gestured towards the monumental research and 
editorial task that awaits the current and further generations of scholars, even while 
providing the methodological resources to undertake it. 
This task comes into relief as all the more important when we consider the 
continuities between the early and later Franciscan schools, which the exposure of the 
early school’s novelty brings to light. As new research on the early school uncovers 
ideas that have generally been attributed to later Franciscans, the thesis becomes 
increasingly untenable that Duns Scotus and his successors simply broke from their 
Franciscan predecessors to follow a previously uncharted via moderna, in which 
philosophy became autonomous from theology, such that reason gave way to 
rationalism and faith to fideism. Rather, a much more nuanced picture emerges in 
which Scotus and others at and after his time worked very much within the 
boundaries of the tradition originally outlined by the likes of Alexander of Hales, 
even while drawing out some of its logical corollaries further than any Franciscan had 
done before them.  
In this connection, my analysis above has also hinted, Scotus and later 
medieval Franciscans continued to function within a distinctly Franciscan religious 
environment. Although their growing enmeshment in university life did have a 
tendency to render the religious quality of Franciscan ideals less evident as time went 
on, studying the work of their predecessors highlights clearly the specific and 
important spiritual and ministerial objectives that underlay the development of 
Franciscan thought. Naturally, those were not the ends of modern and increasingly 
secular thought.  
Although it may therefore be possible to conduct a genealogy of modernity 
which traces how originally Franciscan ideas entered the stream of modern thought 
and took on a life of their own, the decontextualisation this entails renders untenable 
any direct linking of Franciscan and modern thought which would render Franciscans 
somehow ‘responsible’ for modernity and especially its alleged ills, including 
secularisation, resulting from the bifurcation of faith and reason, excessive 
individualism, not only in religious matters but also in society as a whole. When their 
ideas are interpreted as intended through the lens of Francis’ persona and mission, in 
fact it may turn out that the Franciscans themselves have much to offer in terms of a 
counterbalance to such trends. But in an academic environment where so much 
criticism has been levelled against them, this is an area that remains completely open 
to exploration.  
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